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In this paper we continue to develop indicator that determines the quality of the 
interaction regions with natural monopolies. Is considered a generalized example 
of interaction in which the work is carried out simultaneously on several projects. 
In an apparent form obtained formalization index interaction to connect the two 
projects. Indicated by the upper and lower bounds of efficiency for mixed projects 
 





Let’s proceed directly to development and economic and mathematical 
formalization of the interaction index between the natural monopoly and a region 
for a general case of parallel implementation the projects which belong to an 
approved (fixed) complex regional development program. For the special case 
model was built and tested in the works [1, 2]. 
 
1224                                                                                                 Irina Nizovtseva 
 
 
The parallel implemented projects Π (the vertical tubes of the sandwich-
model) constituting a complex regional development program are named as 
natural numbers m=1,2,3. 
The proposed overall effectiveness ratio  and the methodology of its 
practical calculation for each project Π separately are taken as a basis. A 
formula to calculate the effectiveness of interaction on the Π project coefficient 



















Here T is the program duration (range of planning) expressed trough the 
number of reporting units (time periods) of the covering perspective (for instance, 
10 years).  
There is a value %&'()*+,-  in the numerator. %&'()*+,-  is predicted average 
income of the natural monopoly per unit of time from the project Π 
implementation (implemented separately from other projects). Income from 
investments, inflationary processes, the natural monopoly profit from the project 
Π results (increase of traffic volumes and loading and unloading volumes and 
etc.) are considered in this value. A formula and a method of  %&'()*+,-  
determination are given in [3, 4].  
A value ./',,0 1 is losses of a company in the i time period (year) in the 
result of interaction with an economic unit 20 in the frames of Π project. Here 
the node 20 is invested by raised or borrowed funds. From a mathematical point of 
view ./',,0 1 is a negative value. Thus, the modulus of this value 3./',,0 13 
placed in the denominator of the expression for  can be interpreted as the funds 
volume that could be saved by refusing from interaction with a node 20 in the 
indicated form. 
There are two non-negative summands in the denominator of the 
expression, except the predicted averaged income per the unit of time %&'()*+,-  




0 18094 5194  is an averaged possible alternative income of the 
2: company per the unit of time that could be obtained in the case of total 
rejection from the investment activity in the Π project in the region and 
alternative placement the entire volume of investments on bank deposits; 
4
5∑ ;∑ 3./',,
0 13<=>?0984 @5194  is the averaged possible volume of the company’s 2: 
saved funds per unit of time which would be saved by company in the case of 
total rejection from the receivables investment activity in the frames of the Π 
project with nodes-enterprises of the region. 
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2. Introduction interaction index of interdependent  projects 
 
The main idea to define and calculate an interaction index of interdependent 
(dependent from each other) projects is their model merger, i.e. hypothetical 
combination of the group of depended projects in the one vertical (no longer 
elementary) tube of the regional sandwich-model [1, 2]. Further arguments are 
based on similar principles to [5-15]. 
Let’s describe and demonstrate a procedure of the model merger of 
interdependent projects on the easiest example. This example is implementation 
the pair of projects Π and  Π, and implementation of the favorable for the 
natural monopoly project Π is dependent from implementation of the 
unattractive project Π  (for example, due to some contractual agreements 
implementation of  the favorable project Π is impossible without 
implementation of the unfavorable project  Π ). This situation is schematically 
shown in the fig. 2.5.  
 
Let’s unite all elementary tubes corresponding to the projects Π and  
Π to one a vertical tube of the sandwich-model, i.e. let’s start consider all nodes 
(enterprises, organizations, managerial structures) involved in projects Π and  
Π implementation as a one vertical sectionΠ ∪ Π.   The resulting (no 
longer elementary!) vertical section is denoted Π. Now the vertical section 
Π is considered as a one project of the regional program, which integral 
components are manufacturing tasks Π and  Π.  
It is obvious that one can calculate a new effectiveness ratio for a similar 
joint project Π using a general method of determination the isolated projects 
effectiveness ratios   
The   is an interaction index of the joint projects Π and  Π. 
Let’s note that in fact, according to the developed calculation method, the 
coefficient   is calculated independently from the values of the effectiveness 
ratios  and   for each project separately because new initial data is used to 
determine the value  and the values  and   do not participate in the 
formula for defining . Indeed, total volumes of investments to both projects 
and incomes from loans and their time distribution become different, the natural 
monopoly benefit from projects aftereffects is distributed among two projects, 
probable company’s income from placement investments on bank deposits 
changes and etc.  Actually, all factors, taken into account when the effectiveness 
ratio is calculated and involved to its analytical mathematical expression, change.  
ΠBC ΠBD 
Fig. 2.5. The easiest scheme of the projects model merger  
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Let’s analyze in details what happens to the effectiveness ratio when a 
couple of interrelated projects  Π and  Π mergers to the joint project Π. 
The general structure (schematic qualitative appearance of an analytic expression) 




% E FGH , 
 
where % is an averaged income (predicted or already achieved in one or another 
form) from the Π project implementation. This value is formed by the incomes 
from the project Π	aftereffects, income from investment activity, income from 
the project implementation and etc;  
FGH is probable alternative company’s income in the case of canceling 
the project Π implementation. This value is formed by incomes from banks 
deposits (as it would be in the case when the funds for the project Π  
implementation were allocated on bank deposits), volumes of the saved funds and 
resources in the case of complete refuse from the project Π  implementation and 
etc. It is clear that 0 L  L 1   and the Π project effectiveness ratio raises 
when the income %	increasing and falls when the alternative income FGH 
decreases.  
The value ψ inverse to the effectiveness ratio  (let’s conventionally 
name it the extent of the project Π	uselessness for the company) is: 
ψ  1 
% E FGH
%  1 E
FGH
%  
It is obvious that the extent of the project uselessness is always greater 
than one 1 L ψ L E∞ and the extent of uselessness exceeds the one per the 
worsening summand 
P?Q
 ,  which can interpreted as the ratio of the alternative 
income to the real income of the project Π implementation (i.e. the bigger this 
ratio is, the less attractive project  Π	is).  
It is evident that when a pair of projects Π and  Π mergers to the one 
joint project Π in the simplest case of the projects interdependence (i.e. there 
are no additional links between the projects increasing or decreasing projects 
profitability in the case of their joint implementation), there is merger of their real 
profitable parts: %  % E %, and alternative profitable parts: FGH 
FGH 		 E FGH. Hence, the effectiveness ratio of interaction in the joint project 






and the extent of the joint project uselessness (a value inverse to the effectiveness 
ratio) is:  
ψ  4R 
P?QP?Q
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It is evident that the worsening summand that increases the extent of the 
project Π uselessness  is a value P?Q
P?Q
 , i.e. a ratio of the both projects 
total alternative income to the real income of the projects.  
Let’s consider a situation (which is very typical for real situation) when 
implementation the attaching of the influencing unattractive for the natural 
monopoly project and a low-income project  Π is imposed to the natural 
monopoly instead of implementation the beneficial and highly-profitable 
project	Π. In this case  SS  and at the same time the effectiveness ratio 
is very close to zero  T 0 from the natural monopoly point of view.  

P?Q T 0, therefore the real income of the unattractive project is close to zero 
% T 0 because in the case of any project implementation cancelling the 
alternative income is always non-negative FGH S 0. 
To clarify the further conclusions one should imagine the limiting case 
%  0 when the real income of unattractive imposed project Π  is zero. In 
this limiting case the qualitative expressions to the effectiveness ratio  	and 







ψ  1 
% E FGH E FGH
%  1 E
FGH E FGH
% 











  then:  









It shows that the worsening summand (when unattractive project Π  is joint to 
the effective project ΠV) is the value P?Q

 , which presents ratio of the possible 
alternative income from the joint unattractive project Π  to the real expected 
income from the highly-effective project  ΠV.  
There is an obvious and essential inequality from a practical point of view 
which ensures from the written expression for the extent of the joint project 
Π  uselessness (in the case of ratio  S  for the efficiencies of the joint 
projects):  
 L  L  
- the effectiveness ratio of the joint project Π 	is always lower than the 
efficiency of the most profitable project ΠV merger of the projects increases 









It is obvious that the determined effectiveness ratio of the joint projects at 
the merger of projects solves the problem mentioned at the beginning of this 
article because its value takes into consideration influence of the projects to each 
other in the case of conditionality one project (profitable) by another 
(unattractive).  Such method of the interaction index determination gives more 
weight to unattractive projects required to be implemented only for 
implementation of cost-effective point of the regional program. At the same time 
merger with unattractive project decreases effectiveness ratio of the profitable 
project, therefore one should understand that accepting a large number of 
unattractive points of regional program can significantly decrease an overall 
interaction index of its interaction in this region. Extent of possible reduction of 
the joint projects interaction index of the regional program (extent of possible 
concessions in negotiations) has to be determined by economic and in some cases 
political expediency.  
There is one more important conclusion from the analysis of effectiveness 
ratio behavior at the merger of interrelated projects. When projects merge to the 
one joint regional program, the worsening summand, which decreases the 
integrated effectiveness ratio, are ratios 
P?Q
  of probable alternative income from 
the joining unattractive projects Π to the real income from highly-effective 
projects	ΠV.  Hence, there is a strategic direction of negotiations and the whole 
agreement process when regional programs are developed and approved: in order 
to increase effectiveness of the natural monopoly interaction in the region it is 
necessary to achieve the decrease of ratios 
P?Q
  for each unattractive project Π
 
imposed to the natural monopoly.  
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